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To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has
been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware
vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus
was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating
detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces
a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes
responsible for accessing and reporting one’s percept are difficult to distinguish from
those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to
circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012)
and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and
visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our
previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not
immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency
posterior ERP negativity (∼200–240ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report
(aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b
(∼380–480ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest
that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked
with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with
encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC
candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based
attention.
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INTRODUCTION
Determining the neural basis of consciousness is one of the most
challenging problems in modern cognitive neuroscience. Much
progress has been made over the past 25 years by simplifying
the problem and focusing first on identifying neural correlates
of conscious perception or “NCCs” (Baars, 1989; Logothetis and
Schall, 1989; Crick and Koch, 1990, 2003). The primary strategy
has been to compare brain activity elicited by physically identical
stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. While appeal-
ing in its simplicity, this approach has recently been criticized for
being too inclusive in what counts as an NCC (Aru et al., 2012;
de Graaf et al., 2012). Depending on how awareness is manipu-
lated, neural mechanisms that are necessary-but-not-sufficient or
sufficient-but-not-necessary for conscious perception have often
been misinterpreted as true-NCCs. Aru et al. (2012) refer to such
neural processes as “pre-requisites” and “consequences” of con-
scious perception, respectively, and have encouraged researchers
to develop new paradigms to help distinguish the “NCC-proper”
from these related, yet functionally distinct, processes.
TERMINOLOGY AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While the central tenets of Aru et al.’s (2012) proposal are
well-justified, we prefer to use the terms “pre-conscious” and
“post-perceptual” instead of “pre-requisite” and “consequence.”
In our view, the term pre-requisite is too general and the term
consequence too restrictive. For example, retinal processing could
be considered a pre-requisite of visual awareness (with the excep-
tion of TMS-induced phosphenes); however, no one has pro-
posed retinal activity as a potential NCC. The term pre-conscious,
instead, is used here to refer only to cortical and cortico-thalamic
activity following the initial feedforward activation of primary
sensory cortex. Pre-conscious processing immediately precedes
(both temporally and functionally) conscious processing and is
capable of establishing elaborate perceptual representations that
may become conscious (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene
et al., 2006). The term consequence, on the other hand, appears
to be used by Aru and colleagues to refer to certain neural events
that necessarily follow the conscious awareness of a stimulus. In
contrast, the term post-perceptual leaves open the possibility that
conscious perceptionmay occur with or without these subsequent
processing events. As outlined below, simple manipulations of
the task can eliminate post-perceptual processing while leaving
conscious perception intact.
It should also be noted that the term “perceptual awareness”
(often abbreviated as “awareness”) will be used here to describe
situations in which perceptual content is reportable, although
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actual reporting may not take place, e.g., because the subject
has been instructed to only report awareness of certain types
of stimuli. This reportability requirement is commonly used to
operationally define conscious perception but differs from certain
theoretical frameworks that consider some types of perceptual
processing as “phenomenally conscious” even if the subject is
unable to report anything about these percepts when specifically
instructed to do so (Lamme, 2006; Vandenbroucke et al., 2014).
It also differs from notions of phenomenal consciousness in
which perceptual content is accessible, yet not necessarily accessed
(Block, 2007, 2011). In both cases, we consider such process-
ing as “pre-conscious” rather than a special type of unreportable
consciousness, and our main goal is to isolate neural correlates
of “access consciousness” from correlates of pre-conscious and
post-perceptual processing (Dehaene and Changeux, 2004, 2011;
Block, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006). Because the term “access”
can have different meanings in different contexts, we will qual-
ify its usage for clarity, e.g., “conscious access” typically refers to
global availability of perceptual information for flexible use by a
variety of cognitive systems, while “access of perceptual informa-
tion for report” refers to a much narrower set of post-perceptual
operations involved in task-related memory and decision-making
processes.
While it is important to separate both pre-conscious and post-
perceptual activity from correlates of conscious perception, the
current study focuses mainly on post-perceptual processing. To
illustrate the problem of conflating neural correlates of post-
perceptual processing with correlates of conscious perception, it
is useful to consider “the refrigerator door problem” (a neural
counterpart to the “refrigerator light illusion” described by Block,
2001). Imagine you have no access to the internal machinery of a
refrigerator and your goal is to determine under what conditions
the light inside the refrigerator turns on. Youmight start by open-
ing the door to check and proceed to try just opening it a crack
or just for a brief moment. However, every time you open the
door the light is always on and you can’t be sure the light would
have been on if you had kept the door closed. In consciousness
research, one of the goals is to determine whether unique brain
signal X correlates with conscious perception (the light turning
on), but to do so requires a perceptual report from the subject
(opening the door). The problem is that it is often difficult to
determine whether the same brain signal X would have occurred
if the subject had not accessed this information for report (kept
the door closed).
POST-PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING IN PARADIGMS THAT MANIPULATE
VISUAL AWARENESS
To manipulate visual awareness in the lab, the most com-
monly used paradigms include backwardmasking, the attentional
blink, change blindness, binocular rivalry, and signal detection at
threshold (e.g., Pins and ffytche, 2003; Fernandez-Duque et al.,
2003; Sergent et al., 2005; Koivisto et al., 2006; Pitts et al., 2010).
In all cases, subjects are asked to provide some type of percep-
tual report after each trial. These reports range from identification
of target stimuli to detailed visibility ratings such as using a per-
ceptual awareness scale (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). At first
glance, this method of requiring a subjective report after each trial
seems unproblematic. Regardless of whether the stimulus was
consciously perceived, the subject always has to report something
even if the report is “I saw nothing.” Indeed, in many paradigms,
stimuli are visible on roughly half of the trials, and there would be
nomeans of sorting trials into aware vs. unaware conditions with-
out trial-by-trial reports. However, upon closer scrutiny, aware vs.
unaware contrasts in paradigms such as these are likely to expose
not only differences in brain activity related to conscious percep-
tion but also differences in post-perceptual processing. On aware
trials, subjective reports rely on the maintenance of perceptual
information in working memory and access of this information
by higher-level cognitive systems that enable decision-making and
response planning/execution. On unaware trials, there is no con-
scious perceptual information to maintain or access even though
a decisionmust be made and a negative response must be planned
and executed. Thus, in addition to differences in conscious per-
ception, these two types of trials differ in terms of post-perceptual
processing such as maintenance in working memory and access of
perceptual information for decision-making.
Figure 1 provides a simplified schematic outline of some of the
stages of processing likely to be involved in aware vs. unaware
trials for a typical backward masking experiment in which the
stimulus (e.g., an outline square) is perceived on roughly half of
the trials. Note that in addition to differences in visual aware-
ness, the two trial types also differ in post-perceptual processing,
thus any differences in neural activity between aware and unaware
trials may reflect post-perceptual maintenance and access for
report instead of awareness per se. Importantly, the attentional
blink, change blindness, signal detection, and a number of other
paradigms are vulnerable to this same confound.
THE SUSTAINED INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS PARADIGM
As an alternative to these more commonly employed paradigms
to manipulate awareness, we recently adapted the inattentional
blindness paradigm, originally developed and extensively tested in
behavioral studies by Mack and Rock (1998), for use in conjunc-
tion with electrophysiological recordings of brain activity (Pitts
et al., 2012). This paradigm includes three experimental phases.
In the first phase, subjects perform a distracter task while a crit-
ical (unexpected) stimulus is presented directly in the center of
their view. After 200 or more presentations of the critical stim-
ulus, the subjects are queried regarding their awareness of this
stimulus. Typically, about half of all subjects report a complete
lack of awareness of the critical stimulus and are thus deemed
inattentionally blind in this first phase. Importantly, after being
asked about the critical stimulus, subjects are instructed to “con-
tinue performing the same task as before” in the second phase
of the experiment. Due to the intervening questions, all sub-
jects become aware of the critical stimulus during phase 2, but
because they are performing the same distracter task they do
not need to access information about the critical stimulus for
immediate perceptual report. Finally, in the third phase of the
experiment, subjects are instructed to forego the distracter task
and perform a discrimination task in which the critical stimulus
becomes task-relevant.
This modified inattentional blindness paradigm allows
comparisons of brain activity across three conditions in which
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FIGURE 1 | Simplified schematic depicting some of the stages of
processing involved in the two main trial types of a typical backward
masking experiment in which the stimulus is masked at a constant SOA
(e.g., 50ms) and is visible on roughly 50% of trials. In addition to
differences in conscious perception, post-perceptual processing is likely to
differ across the two trial types due to the task demands.
awareness and post-perceptual processing are manipulated in a
step-wise fashion: phase 1 = unaware; phase 2 = aware without
post-perceptual processing (critical stimulus is task-irrelevant);
phase 3 = aware with post-perceptual processing (critical stim-
ulus is task-relevant). Figure 2 sketches a simplified overview
of the stages of processing involved in the three phases of this
inattentional blindness paradigm.
The contrasts of interest in this three-phase experiment are
between brain activity elicited by the critical stimulus in phase
2 vs. phase 1 (i.e., awareness vs. unawareness of task-irrelevant
stimuli) and phase 3 vs. phase 2 (i.e., task-relevant vs. task-
irrelevant stimuli). The first contrast (phase 2 vs. 1) should reveal
neural correlates of conscious perception per se, while the second
contrast (phase 3 vs. 2) isolates correlates of post-perceptual pro-
cessing (maintenance in working memory and access for report).
It should be noted that direct comparisons of brain activity across
phases would be of questionable validity because the ordering
of the three phases cannot be counterbalanced and neural activ-
ity may differ due to repeated exposure to the stimuli, neural
fatigue, sensory adaptation, etc. To circumvent this issue, a con-
trol stimulus (e.g., a randomized background having no shapes
or features) can be randomly intermixed with the critical stim-
uli in each phase, and neural responses to the critical stimulus
can first be contrasted with neural responses to the control stim-
uli within each phase prior to making across-phase comparisons.
Also, in order to prevent contamination by pre-motor andmotor-
related activity, the critical stimuli are never targets that require
manual responses, even in the third phase of the experiment.
Instead, an infrequent target stimulus is also intermixed in all
phases of the experiment, and during the third phase subjects
must discriminate between the critical (non-target) stimulus and
this target stimulus in order to respond appropriately.
PRE-CONSCIOUS, CONSCIOUS, AND POST-PERCEPTUAL EEG
SIGNATURES IN THE SUSTAINED INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS
PARADIGM
Using this modified inattentional blindness paradigm, a poten-
tial NCC-proper was isolated from pre-conscious and post-
perceptual activity (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014; Pitts and Martinez,
2014). Event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by shape stimuli
(formed by oriented line elements) were compared to randomly
oriented control stimuli across the three phases of the experi-
ment. During all three phases (including inattentional blindness),
an initial occipital negativity was evident from ∼160–220ms. We
interpreted this activity as pre-conscious because it was evident
even when subjects did not report any conscious awareness of the
shape stimuli due to inattentional blindness induced by perform-
ing the distracter task. We initially referred to this component as
“Nd1” for “negative difference 1” (Pitts et al., 2012), but have
subsequently labeled it “CIN” for “contour integration negativ-
ity” (Pitts and Martinez, 2014), on the assumption that it reflects
pre-conscious neural activity associated with extracting contour
information from the stimulus array. In the second and third
phases (aware conditions), the CIN was followed by a bilateral
occipital-parietal negativity from ∼200–300ms (initially labeled
“Nd2”), which was similar in timing and scalp topography to
the previously reported “visual awareness negativity” or “VAN”
component (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Railo et al., 2011).
Importantly, this negativity was also elicited during phase 1 in
the group of subjects who later reported having spontaneously
noticed the (irrelevant) shape stimulus. When the shape stimuli
were task-irrelevant, no ERP differences were evident subsequent
to the VAN, as subjects were not required to further process this
information. In the third phase, however, the VAN was followed
by a selection negativity (SN) and two late positive components
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FIGURE 2 | Outline of the modified inattentional blindness paradigm
used by Pitts et al. (2012). Because the critical stimulus (square shape) is
task-irrelevant in phases 1 & 2, post-perceptual processing is avoided while
allowing a contrast that better isolates differences in conscious perception.
Neural correlates of post-perceptual processing can be evaluated by
comparing phases 3 & 2.
(a late occipital positivity “LOP,” and the centro-parietal P3b) as
well as by induced gamma oscillations (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014).
We interpreted these latter effects as post-perceptual because they
were absent in the second phase (aware, task-irrelevant) and
present in the third phase (aware, task-relevant).
In a subsequent experiment (Shafto and Pitts, 2013), we tested
a different critical stimulus, line drawings of faces, in a similar
inattentional blindness paradigm. Here, we found that the face-
specific N170 component as well as the VAN were absent during
inattentional blindness (phase 1) but were present in both aware
conditions (phase 2 and 3). Consistent with the results from the
shape experiment, the SN, LOP, P3b, and induced gamma oscil-
lations were only evident in the third phase in which the face
stimuli were task-relevant. Importantly, in both experiments we
were able to compare brain activity in aware vs. unaware condi-
tions (phase 2 vs. phase 1-unaware subjects) without requiring
immediate access for perceptual report. This was accomplished by
presenting the stimuli well above threshold (300ms duration, eas-
ily visible if expected) and by delaying the perceptual report until
after the entire block of trials (which lasted∼10min and delivered
200+ stimuli). In both the shape and face experiments, subjects
who were initially inattentionally blind often expressed genuine
surprise at having failed to notice such salient stimuli for 10min,
and many subjects reported “not being able to avoid noticing
the stimuli” once they knew the stimuli were being presented
(in phase 2). These design features are critical in paradigms in
which trial-by-trial perceptual reporting is intentionally avoided;
i.e., one must be certain that the critical stimuli are never seen
during the unaware condition and that these same stimuli are
obvious and readily visible during the aware condition, even when
subjects are performing a separate task.
This modified inattentional blindness paradigm shows
promise in helping to distinguish pre-conscious and post-
perceptual activity from the NCC-proper. Future fMRI and intra-
cranial EEG studies should consider adopting similar methods.
However, one drawback with the inattention paradigm is that it
only includes 3 of the possible 4 combinations of visual aware-
ness and task-relevance; i.e., the unaware, task-relevant condition,
which is common in other awareness paradigms, is absent in
the inattentional blindness paradigm. This missing condition,
in which a stimulus is attended and relevant to the task but
not consciously perceived, may be important for separating neu-
ral correlates of awareness from neural correlates of attention.
It is also advantageous to cross-validate results by employing
more than one type of experimental paradigm, and the above
mentioned results have only been obtained so far using the inat-
tentional blindness approach. The current study was designed to
address these outstanding issues.
A 2× 2MANIPULATION OF VISUAL AWARENESS AND
TASK-RELEVANCE IN A MASKING PARADIGM
One option for measuring NCCs using the masking paradigm is
to present stimuli for a brief duration followed by a mask such
that the stimulus is consciously perceived on approximately 50%
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of trials (Koivisto et al., 2008). This approach allows comparisons
of brain activity on aware vs. unaware trials while the physical
stimuli (stimulus + mask) remain identical. Of course, with this
approach all stimuli must be task-relevant because the experi-
menter has no other means of sorting individual trials into aware
and unaware conditions. A different approach is to employ two
different masking latencies (i.e., stimulus durations), one that is
very short leading to 0% awareness and another that is consider-
ably longer resulting in 100% awareness (Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2008). In this variation of the masking paradigm, task-relevance
can be manipulated, and trial-by-trial reporting is unnecessary.
However, the use of two different mask-onset latencies introduces
another problem, namely that brain activity is likely to differ
due to physical stimulus differences as opposed to a difference
in awareness (Bachmann, 2009). For example, ERPs elicited by
a mask presented 16ms after a stimulus will be superimposed
with ERPs elicited by the stimulus, whereas a mask presented
300ms after a stimulus will only affect the stimulus-elicited ERPs
at latencies beyond ∼350ms. To control for this confound, a con-
trol stimulus can be presented and masked at each of the two
latencies, and the ERPs elicited by the control stimuli can be sub-
tracted from the ERPs elicited by the stimuli of interest prior to
making any aware vs. unaware contrasts. The subtraction essen-
tially removes the mask-elicited ERP that is superimposed with
the stimulus-elicited ERP. This was the approach used in the cur-
rent study, which compared stimuli of 16ms (unaware) vs. 300ms
(aware) duration, each of which was either task-relevant or task-
irrelevant on separate blocks of trials. The overall design was
similar to a previous study that compared ERPs elicited bymasked
vs. unmasked letters while spatial and non-spatial attention were
manipulated (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2007).
Here, the stimuli were contour shapes, colored lines, and con-
trol stimuli consisting of a random array of lines (Figure 3A).
We first performed a behavioral detection study in which these
stimuli were masked at 5 different latencies (i.e., stimulus dura-
tions of 16, 33, 50, 67, and 300ms). Based on the results from this
experiment, two masking latencies (16 and 300ms) were selected
for the EEG experiment because these mask-onsets showed close
to 0 and 100% detection rates, respectively, for both shape and
color stimuli. In the EEG experiment, on separate blocks of
trials, shapes or colored-lines were deemed task-relevant, and
the shape, color, and control stimuli were masked at each of the
two latencies. This design allowed comparisons of ERP difference
waves (shape minus control, color minus control) across 4 types
of trials: aware, task-relevant; aware, task-irrelevant; unaware,
task-relevant; unaware, task-irrelevant.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-six healthy adults participated in the EEG experiment. All
were recruited as volunteers and gave informed consent prior to
the beginning of the experiment. Data from eight participants
were later excluded; three due to excessive EEG artifact, and five
due to awareness of some of the 16ms color stimuli, as assessed
by a behavioral post-test (see below). The final group consisted
of 18 participants (mean age: 21 years old; 13 female). An initial
behavioral experiment was conducted to determine the masking
SOAs used in the EEG experiment. Twelve (different) subjects
participated in this behavioral study; data from one subject was
excluded from analyses due to failure to follow task instructions.
All experimental procedures were approved by the Reed College
institutional review board in compliance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
Stimuli consisted of 20 × 20 arrays (visual angle = 6.2 × 6.2◦)
of oriented white line segments (0.34◦), identical to those used
in Pitts et al. (2012, 2014). In the inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs)
the lines were visible and in randomized orientations. Upon each
stimulus presentation all of the lines rotated to new positions
for the specified duration. For control stimuli, the line elements
shifted to new random orientations. Two types of shape stimuli
were created by arranging the new orientations of subsets of line
segments to form a 10 × 10 square or a 7 × 7 diamond. Two types
of color stimuli were created by changing either 3 or 4 of the ran-
domly oriented line segments from white to red (RGB: 255,0,0).
The spatial locations of the red lines were randomized but con-
strained to overlap with the locations of the shape contours to
control for spatial attention across the shape and color tasks (see
procedure below). Across trials, the positions of the red lines var-
ied but were restricted to occur in upper, lower, left, and right
regions with no two red lines being located in the same region.
Example stimuli are shown in Figure 3A. For both the behav-
ioral experiment and the EEG experiment, the line element arrays
were always visible; no blank inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) were
used. Each stimulus presentation was followed by a return to a
new pattern of randomly oriented line segments, which served
as the masking/ISI stimuli; each ISI lasted a random interval
between 1000 and 1200ms. A central fixation cross (0.5◦) was
present at all times. All stimuli were presented on a dark back-
ground (0.07 cd/m2) on an LCD monitor (refresh rate = 60Hz).
Stimuli were created and displayed using Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA).
In the behavioral experiment (Figure 3B), three different
stimuli were presented: square shapes, 4-red-lines, and random
(control) arrays. The diamond and 3-red-line stimuli were not
presented because these stimuli would eventually serve as targets
in the EEG experiment, while the ERPs of interest would be for
the non-target stimuli (squares, 4-red-lines). Each stimulus was
followed by a masking (ISI) stimulus at 5 equiprobable stimulus
onset asynchronies (SOA): 16.67, 33.34, 50, 66.67, and 300ms.
Thus, there were 15 combinations of stimulus-type and mask
SOA, and each combination was presented 20 times. The sub-
ject’s task was to press a response button with their right index
finger whenever they perceived either color or shape. Subjects
were encouraged to adopt a liberal response criterion, responding
even if they just caught a glimpse of color or shape, while avoiding
guessing. The goal of this experiment was to determine a masking
SOA that would render both color and shape invisible for all sub-
jects on all trials. It was also important to verify that the 300ms
stimuli could be detected on 100% of trials.
Based on the results from the behavioral experiment, two
different masking SOAs were employed in the EEG experiment
(16.67 and 300ms), resulting in 10 different stimulus-mask
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FIGURE 3 | Stimuli and methods used in the current experiment. Five
types of stimuli (A) were presented in the EEG experiment (C) while
awareness was manipulated via short vs. long masking SOAs (16 or 300ms).
Task-relevance of the square and 4-red-line stimuli was manipulated by
altering the target detection task. An initial behavioral experiment (B) was
conducted to evaluate stimulus visibility at five different masking SOAs.
combinations: (2 types of shape stimuli + 2 types of color stim-
uli + 1 random control stimulus) × (2 mask SOAs) = 10 com-
binations. During each block of trials, these 10 trial types were
intermixed and presented in random order, each at 10% probabil-
ity. On separate blocks of trials, subjects performed either a color
or a shape task. In the color task, the target stimuli were 3-red-
lines and in the shape task, the diamond stimuli served as targets.
Subjects pressed a response button with their right index finger
upon target detection. In order to control for between-condition
ERP differences associated with motor preparation and execu-
tion, all target trials (and any trials in which subjects responded)
were excluded from ERP analyses. Each task was performed for
900 trials (∼15min) before switching to the other task for 900
trials, and this sequence was then repeated (task-order was coun-
terbalanced across subjects). For example, half of the subjects
performed the color task for 15min, switched to the shape task for
15min, switched back to the color task for 15min, and finished
with 15min of the shape task. Thus, 1800 total trials were com-
pleted for each task, 180 of each stimulus type. Figure 3C shows a
summary of the EEG experiment design, and a video example of
the stimulus sequence is provided in Movie 1.
Because the behavioral experiment revealed detection rates
greater than zero for the 16.67ms color stimuli in some sub-
jects, an additional behavioral post-test was conducted after each
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EEG session. In this post-test, color stimuli (4-red-lines), shape
stimuli (squares), and control stimuli (random arrays) were pre-
sented and masked at 16.67 or 300ms. A total of 180 stimuli were
presented (across three 1min blocks), 30 trials of each stimulus-
mask combination. As in the behavioral study, subjects were
instructed to press a button whenever they detected either color
or shape (employing a liberal response bias). Five of the 26 partic-
ipants detected 16.67ms color stimuli on at least one trial during
this post-test and were excluded from ERP analyses. No subjects
detected any of the 16.67ms shape stimuli, nor were there any
“false alarm” responses to the randomized control stimuli. Active
experiment time for the EEG study was∼60min, short rest breaks
were provided after every 60 trials (∼1min), and longer breaks
were given after every 300 trials (∼5min). Each experimental
session lasted 3.5–4.5 h including EEG cap preparation, practice
trials, rest breaks, and the behavioral post-test.
EEG RECORDING AND ERP PRE-PROCESSING
EEG was noninvasively recorded from the scalp via Ag/AgCl
electrodes sewn into customized caps with 96 electrode place-
ments (EASYCAP, Herrsching, Germany). Electrode locations
were modified from the standard 10–20 system to allow equidis-
tant spacing (electrode positions reported here refer to the
nearest channels of the international 10–20 system). Electrode
impedances were kept below 5 k. Signals were digitized (at
500Hz) and amplified by three 32 channel amplifiers (Brain Amp
Standard, Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). Eye movements
and blinks weremonitored by left and right horizontal EOG chan-
nels and a vertical EOG channel under the left eye, respectively.
An electrode positioned at CPz served as the reference during
recording.
ERPs were time-locked to the line segment orientation
changes, low-pass filtered at 25Hz (24dB/Oct), re-referenced to
the average of the left and right mastoids, and baseline corrected
from −100 to 0ms. The left and right horizontal EOG channels
were re-referenced as a bipolar pair. Trials were discarded if they
contained eye movements, blinks, or other muscle artifacts in a
−600 to +600ms interval surrounding stimulus-onset. Artifact
detection was accomplished semi-automatically via per-subject
adjustment of the following peak-to-peak thresholds: eye move-
ments (50µV, 50ms steps, in bipolar HEOG), blinks (100µV,
200ms steps, in VEOG and FP1), and muscle noise (150µV,
200ms steps, all remaining channels). On average, 16% of trials
were rejected due to a combination of these artifacts. Individual
electrodes showing extended periods of noise in the raw EEGwere
removed and replaced by interpolated signals from surrounding
channels using topographic spherical splines (channels included
in ANOVAs were not interpolated).
ERP ANALYSES
Our strategy for ERP analyses was to first identify time win-
dows and electrodes of interest in the grand-averaged difference
waves of all conditions averaged together, using our previous
results as a guide (Pitts et al., 2012). Peak latencies were identi-
fied andmean amplitudes were assessed in± 20ms time windows
around these peaks (± 50ms for the broad P3b). The elec-
trode showing the maximal signal, along with 5–8 adjacent sites
(according to each component’s scalp topography), were selected
for analysis. For the shape stimulus difference waves (shapeminus
random), four distinct components were evident, each of which
closely matched our previous results in terms of timing and
scalp distribution: contour integration negativity, “CIN” (160–
200ms), visual awareness negativity, “VAN” (200–240ms), late
occipital positivity, “LOP” (310–350ms), and the “P3b” (380–
480ms). For the color stimulus difference waves (color minus
random), four components were also evident, some of which
showed reduced latencies compared to the corresponding shape-
elicited components. The first color-elicited component showed
a very similar time course and scalp topography to a previously
reported color vs. non-color ERP difference (Schoenfeld et al.,
2003). This component, which consisted of a midline ventral-
posterior negativity accompanied by a vertex positivity from 130
to 170ms, has previously been referred to as the “sensory effect
of color” which we abbreviate here as “SEC” (Zinni et al., 2014).
The SEC (130–170ms) was followed by the VAN (200–240ms),
LOP (290–330ms), and P3b (380–480ms) components, each of
which showed similar scalp topographies to their shape-elicited
counterparts.
Statistical analyses began with 2 × 2 ANOVAs with the factors
awareness (16 or 300ms durations) and task-relevance (attended
or unattended) for each difference wave component using the
time windows specified above. Difference wave amplitudes were
averaged across electrode clusters according to the scalp topogra-
phies of each component as follows: CIN [PO4, P6, O2, PO8, O10,
PO10]; SEC [FC1, FCZ, FC2, C1, CZ, C2, CPZ]; VAN [PO4, P6,
O2, PO8, O10, PO10]; LOP [P1, PZ, P2, PO3, POZ, PO4, O1, OZ,
O2]; P3b [CP1, CPZ, CP2, P1, PZ, P2, POZ].
All main effects and interactions were then further explored
by conducting cluster mass permutation tests on the difference
amplitudes (shape minus random; color minus random) for each
of the 4 conditions separately (aware, task-relevant; aware, task-
irrelevant; unaware, task-relevant; unaware, task-irrelevant). To
increase statistical power, separate tests were carried out for the
early (100–300ms) and late (300–600ms) time windows and
permutation analyses were restricted to 63 of the 96 electrodes
(covering central, parietal, temporal, and occipital regions) based
on a priori hypotheses regarding scalp topographies of each com-
ponent. Thus, 6363 comparisons were made for the early time
window and 9450 for the late time window. In all cases, two-
tailed cluster mass permutation tests (Bullmore et al., 1999), with
a family-wise alpha level of 0.05, were conducted using the orig-
inal data and 2500 random within-subject permutations of the
data. Electrodes within approximately 3.02 cm of one another
were considered spatial neighbors. All cluster mass permutation
analyses were carried out using the mass univariate ERP Toolbox
(Groppe et al., 2011).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT
Mean shape and color detection rates at each of the five masking
SOAs tested are provided in Figure 4. Overall, the shape stimu-
lus was more readily masked than the color stimulus. Eight of
the 11 subjects never responded to shapes presented for 16ms,
two subjects responded once (5%) and one subject twice (10%);
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FIGURE 4 | Detection rates as a function of masking SOA for shape
(square) and color (4-red-lines) stimuli in the behavioral experiment.
Error bars reflect the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
note that some of these responses may have reflected accidental
button presses rather than transient perceptual capacities. For the
16ms color stimulus, five subjects never responded, and detection
rates for the remaining six subjects were as follows: 10, 15, 25,
30, 30, 40%. The average false alarm rate (responses to random
stimuli at any of the five stimulus durations) was 0.5%. Three
subjects had 2% false alarm rates while all other subjects had zero
false alarms. All three subjects showing false alarm rates > 0 also
showed detection rates > 0 for the 16ms color stimulus.
Because our goal was to identify a single masking SOA that
could render both shape and color stimuli invisible for a large
majority of subjects/trials, we chose the 16ms SOA for use in the
EEG experiment. Importantly, because roughly half of the sub-
jects in this behavioral experiment showed non-zero detection
rates for the 16ms color stimulus, we also administered a behav-
ioral post-test after each EEG session (see methods above). We
excluded from EEG analyses any subject who responded to one or
more 16ms stimuli in this post-test (five out of 26 subjects were
excluded for this reason). For the remaining subjects, detection
rates in this behavioral post-test were 0% for both 16ms stimuli
and 97.73% (s.e.m. = 0.18%) and 98.19% (s.e.m. = 0.10%) for
the 300ms shape and color stimuli, respectively.
EEG EXPERIMENT
Behavioral results from the EEG experiment indicated that the
shape task was slightly more difficult than the color task, although
performance on both tasks was strong. For the shape task, subjects
detected the 300ms diamond-shaped targets on 93.55% of trials
(s.e.m. = 1.3%), d′ = 4.61 (s.e.m.= 0.11), RT= 563ms (s.e.m. =
10ms). For the color task, subjects detected the 300ms 3-red-line
targets on 98.24% of trials (s.e.m. = 0.5%), d′ = 4.68 (s.e.m. =
0.09), RT = 537ms (s.e.m. = 10ms). While d′ did not differ sta-
tistically across the two tasks, RTs were significantly shorter for the
color task, t(18) = 4.56, p = 0.0003. Response rates to the 16ms
color and 16ms shape targets were both 0%.
Grand-averaged ERPs elicited by the non-target shape and
color stimuli are compared to ERPs elicited by the random
(control) stimuli in Figures 5, 6, respectively. In both figures,
electrodes representative of the scalp locations of the main com-
ponents of interest are shown. Note that the ERPs elicited by
the control stimuli differ according to stimulus duration and
that within-block comparisons were made in all cases. For exam-
ple, the shape-elicited ERPs in the aware, task-relevant condi-
tion were compared to the random-stimulus ERPs during the
shape-task blocks, whereas the shape-elicited ERPs in the aware,
task-irrelevant condition were compared to the random-stimulus
ERPs during the color-task blocks. Difference waves formed by
subtracting the ERPs to the appropriate control stimuli from the
ERPs to the shape and color stimuli are shown in Figure 7. In
these difference waves the components CIN (shape) SEC (color),
VAN, LOP, and P3b can be visualized. Results from all statisti-
cal analyses are provided below for shape and color stimuli, for
each of the components of interest, organized according to their
temporal sequence (see Methods Section for descriptions of each
component’s time course and scalp distribution).
Early sensory effects
ANOVA for the CIN component elicited by the outline square
showed a main effect of awareness, F(17) = 12.42 (p = 0.0026), a
main effect of task-relevance, F(17) = 11.74 (p = 0.0032), and no
interaction. Cluster mass permutation analyses for each condition
separately confirmed that these main effects were due to signifi-
cant amplitude differences in the aware, task-relevant (−1.58µV,
SD = 1.38) and aware, task-irrelevant (−0.91µV, SD = 1.41)
conditions (Figure S1). Difference amplitudes in the unaware,
task-relevant and unware, task-irrelevant conditions did not sig-
nificantly differ from zero; although a trend toward a negative
difference over the posterior scalp was observed for the unaware,
task-relevant conditions (see Figure 8).
ANOVA for the SEC component elicited by the colored
lines revealed a main of effect of awareness, F(17) = 15.24 (p =
0.0011), with no main effect of task-relevance, nor an interac-
tion between the two. Permutation analyses confirmed significant
amplitude differences in the aware, task-relevant (1.87µV, SD =
2.16) and aware, task-irrelevant (0.83µV, SD = 1.24) conditions,
while amplitude differences in both unaware conditions were not
significant (Figure S2).
Visual awareness negativity (VAN)
For the shape-elicited VAN component, ANOVA resulted in a
main effect of awareness, F(17) = 11.83 (p = 0.0031), a main
effect of task-relevance, F(17) = 17.83 (p = 0.00057), and a sig-
nificant interaction, F(17) = 8.42 (p = 0.0099). Cluster mass per-
mutation tests revealed a significant VAN component in the
aware, task-relevant and aware, task-irrelevant conditions and
an absence of this component in both unaware conditions. The
interaction between awareness and task-relevance was explained
by a substantial amplitude increase in the aware, task-relevant
(−3.19µV, SD = 3.09) compared to the aware, task-irrelevant
condition (−1.58µV, SD = 2.02).
ANOVA for the color-elicited VAN showed a main effect
of awareness, F(17) = 40.91 (p = 0.000007), a main effect of
task-relevance, F(17) = 15.05 (p = 0.0012), and an interaction
between the two F(17) = 14.21 (p = 0.0015). Similar to the
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FIGURE 5 | Grand-averaged ERPs elicited by shape (square) and random (control) stimuli across the four main experimental conditions.
shape-elicited VAN, cluster permutation tests showed significant
amplitude differences in both aware conditions and the interac-
tion was explained by relatively larger amplitudes in the aware,
task-relevant (−5.77µV, SD = 3.91) vs. the aware, task-irrelevant
condition (−3.56µV, SD = 2.54) along with no significant dif-
ferences in either of the unaware conditions.
Late positivites
ANOVA for the shape-elicited LOP component showed a main
effect of awareness, F(17) = 46.79 (p = 0.000003), a main effect
of task-relevance, F(17) = 11.03 (p = 0.0040), and a significant
interaction, F(17) = 29.60 (p = 0.000044). Permutation tests sug-
gested that these effects were due to a large amplitude difference in
the aware, task-relevant condition (4.48µV, SD = 2.70), a smaller
difference in the aware, task-irrelevant condition (1.48µV, SD =
2.02), along with no significant amplitude differences in either
unaware condition.
For the color-elicited LOP, ANOVA indicated a main effect
of awareness, F(17) = 15.67 (p = 0.0010), a main effect of
task-relevance, F(17) = 35.41 (p = 0.000016), and a significant
interaction, F(17) = 25.05 (p = 0.00011). However, unlike the
shape-elicited LOP, cluster mass permutation tests showed that
these effects were driven by a large amplitude difference in the
aware, task-relevant condition (4.59µV, SD = 3.48), along with a
smaller effect in the unaware, task-relevant condition (0.67µV,
SD = 1.09). No amplitude differences during the LOP time
window were evident in the aware, task-irrelevant or unaware,
task-irrelevant conditions.
Finally, for the P3b analyses, ANOVA for the shape stim-
uli resulted in a main effect of awareness, F(17) = 26.67
(p = 0.000078), a main effect of task-relevance, F(17) = 18.51
(p = 0.00048), and a significant interaction, F(17) = 36.85 (p =
0.000012). All of these effects were driven by a large ampli-
tude difference in the aware, task-relevant condition (7.72µV,
SD = 5.85), along with no significant amplitude effects in
any of the other conditions. Although cluster permutation
analyses showed positive amplitude differences in the aware,
task-irrelevant condition from ∼300–400ms (Figure S1), these
effects correspond to the small LOP described above and were
absent for electrode sites and time windows corresponding
to the P3b.
ANOVA for the P3b elicited by the color stimuli also showed
a main effect of awareness, F(17) = 33.32 (p = 0.000023), a main
effect of task-relevance, F(17) = 34.71 (p = 0.000018), and a sig-
nificant interaction, F(17) = 22.63 (p = 0.00018). Cluster mass
permutation tests for each condition revealed a different pat-
tern of effects from that of the shape-elicited P3b. In this case,
color-elicited P3b amplitudes were significant for all conditions
except the unaware, task-irrelevant condition. The P3b in the
unaware, task-relevant condition (1.31µV, SD = 1.43) was simi-
lar in magnitude to the P3b in the aware, task-irrelevant condition
(1.73µV, SD = 1.76) and occurred slightly earlier in time (see
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FIGURE 6 | Grand-averaged ERPs elicited by color (4-red-lines) and random (control) stimuli across the four main experimental conditions.
Figure S2), while the P3b in the aware, task-relevant condition
was clearly the largest (8.28µV, SD = 5.50).
Results summary
Figures 8, 9 provide summaries of the results for shape and
color stimuli, respectively. In these figures, scalp topographies
for each of the main components (defined by amplitude differ-
ences between shape and random ERPs, and color and random
ERPs, respectively) are provided across all four conditions result-
ing from the 2 × 2 manipulation of awareness and task-relevance.
Asterisks under the scalp maps indicate that a significant ampli-
tude difference was found during the component’s time-window
as assessed by cluster mass permutation tests.
The overall goal of this experiment was to identify components
that are present in both aware conditions (regardless of task-
relevance) and absent in both unaware conditions. Across the
shape and color stimuli, only the early sensory components (CIN,
SEC) and the visual awareness negativity (VAN) showed this pat-
tern. For both shape and color, these components were evident
in aware conditions and absent in unaware conditions, regard-
less of task-relevance. Whereas the LOP also showed this pattern
for the shape stimuli (Figure 8), it was absent for aware, task-
irrelevant color stimuli (Figure 9). The P3b did not consistently
correlate with awareness in shape or color trials (Figures 8, 9),
being absent for aware, task-irrelevant shapes, and present for
unaware, task-relevant color.
DISCUSSION
In agreement with previous results using the inattentional blind-
ness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014), the present study used
a 2 × 2 manipulation of awareness and task-relevance in a back-
ward masking task and found a consistent ERP correlate of con-
scious visual perception, the visual awareness negativity (VAN)
component. The VAN is a mid-latency occipital-parietal negativ-
ity (measured here from 200 to 240ms) that has been targeted by
a number of previous studies using various awareness manipu-
lations (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003, 2008, 2010; Ojanen et al.,
2003; Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004; Koivisto et al., 2005; Wilenius
and Revonsuo, 2007; Railo et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2013).
ERP components preceding the VAN are likely to reflect pre-
conscious processing, considering that a previous study using
identical stimuli (Pitts et al., 2012) found evidence for the elicita-
tion of such components in unaware (and unmasked) conditions.
In the current study, components prior to the VAN were absent in
the unaware conditions, suggesting interference of pre-conscious
processing by the masking stimulus (presented at 16ms SOA).
Components subsequent to the VAN have often been proposed
as potential NCCs, including most notably the P3b component
(Sergent et al., 2005; Babiloni et al., 2006; Del Cul et al., 2007;
Lamy et al., 2009; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Batterink et al.,
2012; Kouider et al., 2013). The current study, however, pro-
vides evidence against this view, as the P3b along with another
component subsequent to the VAN (the LOP) did not consistently
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FIGURE 7 | Grand-averaged difference waves for shape stimuli (square
minus random) and color stimuli (4-red-lines minus random) across the
four conditions of interest. Components are labeled at representative
electrodes. CIN, contour-integration negativity; SEC, sensory effect of color;
VAN, visual awareness negativity; LOP, late occipital positivity; P3b,
centro-parietal positivity.
correlate with awareness. Instead, these later components are
likely to reflect post-perceptual or attention-based processes nec-
essary for completing the task, as their amplitudes were by far the
largest in the aware/task-relevant condition. Moreover the P3b
was present in some of the unaware, task-relevant conditions, and
absent in some of the aware, task-irrelevant conditions.
CORRELATES OF VISUAL AWARENESS vs. POST-PERCEPTUAL
PROCESSING
It is difficult to create controlled conditions in which subjects are
aware vs. unaware of physically identical stimuli without requir-
ing an immediate trial-by-trial perceptual report. Nevertheless,
it is important to devise new methods for allowing such con-
trasts because the neural correlates of conscious perception are
easily confusable with the neural correlates of post-perceptual
maintenance and access for immediate subjective report. In both
task-relevant and task-irrelevant situations (in which the stimuli
are readily visible), subjects are considered to be conscious of the
perceptual information because whenever they are asked to report
what they see, they are able to easily do so. It follows that brain
activity associated with conscious perception should be present
in both cases. However, when perceptual information is accessed
for immediate report, a variety of additional neural processes
are likely to ensue, each of which is related to “doing something
extra” with the perceptual information the subject is already con-
scious of. Importantly, our manipulation of task-relevance was
designed to test a particular post-perceptual process: access of
perceptual information for report. This should not be confused
with the more general concept of conscious access (Dehaene and
Changeux, 2004; Block, 2005), which we assume was present in
our aware (300ms stimulus) task-irrelevant conditions. In other
words, we expect that on any given trial, if the subjects had
been asked, they would have easily been able to report seeing
the 300ms task-irrelevant stimuli (this was indirectly verified
by our behavioral experiment and behavioral post-test), thus
perceptual information was globally available but the subjects
did not have to use this information to complete the primary
task-at-hand.
In our previous inattentional blindness experiments (Pitts
et al., 2012, 2014; Shafto and Pitts, 2013), we attempted to
deal with this issue by rendering a stimulus easily visible (if
expected) but irrelevant to the task-at-hand and delaying the
perceptual report until after a full block of trials. In this sit-
uation, in which subjects were fully aware of a stimulus but
did not have to do anything with the perceptual information
because it was irrelevant to the task, we found that only early
sensory (CIN) and mid-latency (VAN) ERP components were
elicited. Subsequent components such as the P3b were only
evident when the stimuli became relevant to the task. In the
current experiment, instead of diverting attention to create an
unaware condition, we severely masked some stimuli (16ms
masking SOA) and compared ERPs to conditions in which
the same stimuli were clearly visible (300ms masking SOA).
Importantly, in order to assess post-perceptual processing we
manipulated the task such that stimuli were relevant to the
task during some blocks of trials and irrelevant during other
blocks. We found a similar pattern of results as in the inat-
tentional blindness studies, in that the VAN was consistently
associated with perceptual awareness, while subsequent compo-
nents were either absent when the stimuli were irrelevant to
the task or present when subjects were unaware of task-relevant
stimuli.
Despite the main pattern of results, it remains possible that a
small P3b was present (but below the statistical threshold) during
aware, task-irrelevant shape trials (both in the current study as
well as in Pitts et al., 2012 and Pitts et al., 2014). In this case, one
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FIGURE 8 | Grand-averaged difference wave topographies (square
minus random) plotted over the posterior scalp for the four
components of interest (columns) across the four main experimental
conditions (rows). Note that the amplitude scale for the CIN component
was adjusted to ± 1µV for the unaware conditions, and for the VAN
component ± 2µV for all conditions except the aware, task-relevant
condition. Asterisks indicate significant amplitude differences (p < 0.05)
between shape and random ERP as assessed via cluster mass permutation
tests for each condition separately.
might argue that the P3b is a correlate of conscious perception
but was very weak during the task-irrelevant conditions because
subjects were so focused on the relevant stimuli that they only
caught a glimpse of the irrelevant stimuli on a subset of trials.
Future studies might address this by incorporating infrequent,
unexpected, probe trials in which the experiment is interrupted
after a task-irrelevant stimulus and subjects are asked to “report
what you just saw.” If subjects can always report awareness of
task-irrelevant stimuli, but the P3b is still absent, a stronger case
could be made for a lack of a relationship between the P3b and
awareness; however, one must be careful to avoid inadvertently
rendering the task-irrelevant stimuli relevant by including too
many “surprise” report trials.
ATTENTION IN THE ABSENCE OF AWARENESS?
An unexpected finding in the current study was evidence for
a P3b elicited in the absence of reported awareness. This effect
appeared in the unaware, task-relevant condition for color stim-
uli. It was absent for the equivalent condition for shape stimuli
and there was no evidence for a P3b in any of the unaware, task-
irrelevant conditions. While very few studies have reported a P3b
in the absence of conscious perception, it is generally accepted
FIGURE 9 | Grand-averaged difference wave topographies (4-red-lines
minus random) plotted over the posterior scalp for the four
components of interest (columns) across the four main experimental
conditions (rows). Note that the amplitude scales for the SEC and LOP
components were adjusted to ± 1µV for the unaware conditions, and for
the P3b component ± 2µV for all conditions except the aware,
task-relevant condition. Asterisks indicate significant amplitude differences
(p < 0.05) between shape and random ERP as assessed via cluster mass
permutation tests for each condition separately.
that attention and awareness are independent (yet often inter-
act), and there is growing evidence for attentional modulations in
the absence of awareness (Bernat et al., 2001; Koch and Tsuchiya,
2007; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2009;
Bachmann, 2011; Tallon-Baudry, 2011; Marchetti, 2012; Aru and
Bachmann, 2013). We previously posited that the P3b is post-
perceptual and argued that while the P3b does not appear to be
necessary for conscious perception, it may be a sufficient marker;
i.e., whenever a P3b is observed one can be confident that the
subject was aware of the stimulus (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014). The
current result, however, suggests that the P3b might not be nec-
essary or sufficient, as it was elicited by color stimuli of which
the subject was presumably unaware. Interestingly, the P3b was
completely absent for task-irrelevant color stimuli of which the
subject was also unaware, thus suggesting a task-based attentional
modulation of perceptually undetected stimuli. This result is con-
sistent with a recent study that showed an N2pc component for
color singletons that captured attention even when the subject
was unaware of the stimuli, but only when color was relevant to
the search task (Ansorge et al., 2010), as well as an earlier study
that found evidence of attention capture (N2pc) in the absence
of awareness due to object substitution masking (Woodman and
Luck, 2003). Similarly, recent studies have provided evidence for
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working memory related processing in the absence of aware-
ness (Hassin et al., 2009; Gilchrist and Cowan, 2010; Soto et al.,
2011).
An alternative explanation for this finding is that some subjects
on some trials may have been partially aware of the 16ms color
stimuli even though their reports indicated lack of awareness. In
these partial awareness situations, subjects may have attempted
to perform the discrimination task (to determine if the stimu-
lus contained 3 or 4 red lines) but could only detect the presence
of color without being able to discriminate between target and
non-target color stimuli (see Windey et al., 2014 for a recent
review of graded vs. dichotomous awareness). While we con-
ducted an initial behavioral study to determine an appropriate
masking SOA and administered a behavioral post-test to each of
the EEG subjects in which a simple detection task replaced the
discrimination task, it is still possible that some residual aware-
ness for a number of color stimuli occurred during the EEG
portion of the study. Indeed, we excluded five out of the origi-
nal 26 participants because they were able to detect at least one of
the 16ms color stimuli during the behavioral post-test. Because
one of the goals of the current design was to avoid trial-by-
trial reports, we intentionally did not acquire the data necessary
to fully evaluate this alternative interpretation. Future studies
should consider following up on this preliminary result in order
to determine whether a P3b can be elicited during attentive, but
unaware conditions, perhaps by employing a detection task with
low response criterion during EEG recording (Squires et al., 1973,
1975).
PRE-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING
In contrast to our previous results using the inattentional blind-
ness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012), the current study provided
no evidence for an early pre-conscious ERP difference between
shape and random stimuli in the unaware conditions. One of
the major findings in our previous study was that a compo-
nent we labeled as Nd1 (for negative difference 1, here referred
to as the CIN), distributed over the occipital midline from
∼160–200ms, was elicited in all conditions, even when subjects
were unaware of (inattentionally blind to) the shape patterns.
Why was this component absent from the unaware conditions
in the current study? The most likely possibility is due to the
differences in bottom-up stimulus strength between the two stud-
ies, a factor that is known to influence whether a stimulus will
be processed non-consciously, pre-consciously, or consciously
(Dehaene et al., 2006). In our previous inattentional blind-
ness experiment, the shape stimuli were always presented for
300ms in duration (including the unaware condition), whereas
the current study employed heavily masked stimuli (16ms dura-
tions) to create the unaware conditions. In line with the inter-
actions between top-down attention and bottom-up stimulus
strength described by Dehaene et al. (2006), the current results
showed a small (just below statistical threshold) CIN in the
unaware, task-relevant condition. In other words, with such
severe masking and the resulting reduction of bottom-up stim-
ulus strength, an unseen stimulus might only be processed pre-
consciously if attended. In contrast, in our previous study top-
down attention was not required because sufficient bottom-up
stimulus strength allowed this same stimulus to be processed
pre-consciously.
One of the advantages of the current experimental design
was a degree of internal replication made possible by the 2 × 2
crossing of the color and shape stimuli/tasks. This allows one to
ask whether the same pattern of results seen for the shape stim-
uli was also observed for the color stimuli. An early sensory effect
of color (SEC) was not observed for either of the unaware condi-
tions, although a trend in this direction was evident (see Figure 9,
left column, third row). To further explore how pre-conscious
processing is influenced by top-down attention and bottom-up
stimulus strength, future studies could present extended duration
color stimuli during inattentional blindness or present backward-
masked color stimuli at various masking SOAs while manipulat-
ing task-relevance.
VAN: ATTENTION OR AWARENESS?
A main focus of recent consciousness research has been the rela-
tionship between attention and awareness (Tsuchiya and van
Boxtel, 2013). Historically, attention and consciousness were
often treated as similar if not identical concepts; nowadays, how-
ever, many researchers are proposing that each refers to a separate
category of neural and psychological processes. Although atten-
tion and awareness may be functionally distinct, the question of
whether each can exist independently of the other remains a topic
of debate (Cohen et al., 2011, 2012; Tsuchiya et al., 2012; Aru
and Bachmann, 2013). One view posits that attention can oper-
ate in the absence of awareness, and awareness can occur in the
absence of attention, whereas an opposing view argues that while
attention can influence processing of stimuli of which the sub-
ject is unaware, there is no such thing as awareness in the absence
of attention; i.e., attention is necessary for conscious perception.
Results from experiments employing the inattentional blindness
paradigm offer strong support for the latter view (Cohen et al.,
2011; Mack and Clarke, 2012; Pitts et al., 2012).
The present results, along with our previous inattentional
blindness results, suggest that the most viable candidate for an
ERP correlate of awareness is the VAN (Nd2) component. In our
previous study (Pitts et al., 2012), a well-known attention-related
component, the SN (Harter and Aine, 1984; Hillyard and Anllo-
Vento, 1998), was evident immediately after the VAN, but was
only observed in conditions where the stimulus was task-relevant.
Distinguishing between the VAN and the SN in a data-driven
manner is not easy, because both components consist of a mid-
latency (∼200–300ms), posterior, bi-lateral negativity. To further
complicate matters, both the VAN and the SN show variable (and
overlapping) latencies depending on the stimuli and task. The
only way to isolate the VAN from the SN component may be to
manipulate task-relevance; in our previous study both compo-
nents were present in task-relevant situations, whereas only the
VAN was present in aware but task-irrelevant conditions (Pitts
et al., 2012). In the present study, however, no clear SN was evi-
dent in the aware, task-relevant condition, perhaps because the
stimuli used here were so easily discriminable that the process-
ing resources indexed by the SN did not have to be engaged.
Alternatively, it is possible that the VAN measured in the current
study overlapped the SN in the task-relevant condition such that
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the two components were indistinguishable. It will be important
for future studies to distinguish between the VAN and the SN,
especially in situations in which the stimuli are task-relevant.
In the current study as well as in Pitts et al. (2012), the ampli-
tude of the VAN was larger in the task-relevant compared to the
task-irrelevant condition. If the VAN indeed reflects perceptual
awareness, which is often assumed to be an all-or-none phe-
nomenon (you see the stimulus or you don’t), why might its
amplitude vary according to the task? One possibility might be
that subjects were not aware of the task-irrelevant 300ms stim-
uli on every single trial because their attention was focused on
a separate task (i.e., partial inattentional blindness). This seems
unlikely, especially for the color stimuli (see Movie 1); in a sepa-
rate experiment (Pitts et al., 2014) we found a 0% inattentional
blindness rate for similar 300ms color stimuli. Another possibil-
ity is that the timing of perceptual awareness is more consistent
across trials when the stimulus is relevant to the task; whereas, on
task-irrelevant trials subjects may notice the irrelevant stimuli on
every trial but at slightly different times on different trials because
their primary task is to determine if a potential target is present.
If this is the case, one would expect larger amplitudes with briefer
time-courses for awareness-related ERPs in task-relevant condi-
tions and smaller amplitudes with extended durations for the
same ERP components in task-irrelevant conditions, given that
the ERPs are derived by averaging across many trials. Data from
Pitts et al. (2012) follow this pattern very closely, and although
the current data show amplitude differences for the VAN with-
out obvious corresponding differences in component duration,
the shape of the VAN is slightly skewed with a longer right-tail
in the task-irrelevant condition (see Figure 7), consistent with
the trial-by-trial latency jitter account. A third alternative expla-
nation is that the VAN and SN components may have been
temporally superimposed such that only a portion of this negativ-
ity reflects perceptual awareness. The amplitude increase during
task-relevant situations might be due to an increase in top-down
attention reflected by the SN component, rather than a larger
number of aware trials or greater trial-to-trial consistency in the
timing of awareness.
While there is growing evidence that the VAN tracks closely
with awareness while the SN varies as a function of task demands
and attention, it is important to acknowledge the existence of
a variety of attentional processes. In addition to exogenous
(bottom-up) and endogenous (top-down) attention, visual atten-
tion can be selectively allocated to spatial locations, features,
or entire objects. An alternative interpretation of the VAN is
that it reflects some form of object-based attention that is nec-
essary for conscious perception (perhaps a specific interaction
between attention and high-level perceptual representations).
Because many manipulations of awareness also involve manipu-
lations of attention, this possibility cannot be easily discounted.
To give some examples, inattentional blindness involves altering
attention to alter awareness; backward masking at short vs. long
latencies alters bottom-up attention to influence awareness; back-
ward masking and signal detection at threshold capitalizes on
stochastic trial-by-trial fluctuations of attention; the attentional
blink involves differences in attention between seen and unseen
stimuli; and change blindness differs from change detection based
on the allocation of spatial attention. Because of the common
co-manipulation of attention and awareness across a variety of
paradigms, we previously argued that naming an ERP component
the “visual awareness negativity” (VAN) might be pre-mature
(Pitts et al., 2012), although we adopt this nomenclature here for
consistency with the literature. If the VAN turns out to reflect a
type of object-based attention instead of awareness per se, this
might suggest that an obvious ERP correlate of conscious per-
ception has yet to be discovered (Verleger, 2010). This would
explain the amplitude increase for the VAN in task-relevant vs.
task-irrelevant conditions, i.e., task-relevance enhances object-
based attention. Importantly, this would not mean that a neural
correlate of awareness does not exist, but rather that ERPs can
only measure a limited set of neuronal events. In any case, studies
of ERPs can still be useful in helping to narrow down the time-
window for which potential NCCs could be found, while more
sensitive techniques such as intra-cranial recordings in human
epileptic patients may be necessary to identify NCCs.
A final possibility worth consideration is whether a particular
type of interaction between attention and perceptual representa-
tion is the underlying neural mechanism of conscious awareness,
and the VAN is a marker of this type of interaction. To explore
this idea, future consciousness research might focus efforts on
understanding object-based attention, perceptual encoding, and
the interaction between the two, rather than searching for neu-
rons or neural networks specifically dedicated to consciousness
per se (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). Currently, there is not strong
evidence for or against the view that the VAN component reflects
object-based attention instead of visual awareness. In addition
to developing experimental paradigms which can better isolate
NCC-proper from pre-conscious and post-perceptual activity
(the focus of the current special issue), it is imperative that
researchers craft experimental designs that improve our chances
of distinguishing between neural correlates of object-based atten-
tion and neural correlates of awareness.
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